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FINGERPRINT EVIDENCE
Sandy L. Zabell, Ph.D.*
I. FINGERPRINTS REVISITED?
Recent years have seen an increasing number of challenges to
fingerprint evidence.1 Given its long standing as the “gold
standard” of human identification, this may seem surprising, but
there are, in fact, several natural reasons for this unexpected
development. The first and most important of these is undoubtedly
the spectacular rise to prominence of DNA technologies in the
forensic arena. DNA identification has not only transformed and
revolutionized forensic science, it has also created a new set of
standards that have raised expectations for forensic science in
general.2 Traditional areas of criminalistics that have large
* Professor of Mathematics and Statistics at Northwestern University. I am
grateful to Simon Cole for generously sharing his extensive knowledge of this
subject, and for providing many helpful references and comments. Thanks also
to Margaret Berger, David Kaye, Gregory O’Reilly for helpful comments on an
initial draft of the manuscript, and Matthew Tulchin for editorial assistance.
1
See U.S. v. Navarro-Fletes, No. 01-30247, 2002 WL 31420123, at *1-2
(9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2002) (ruling that the district court did not err in admitting
fingerprint testimony); U.S. v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming
that latent fingerprint identification satisfies Daubert); U.S. v. Salim, 189 F.
Supp. 2d 93, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding that the methodology undertaken by
the government’s fingerprint witness met the Daubert standard); U.S. v. Llera
Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (discussing whether the FBI’s
fingerprint identification technique satisfied Daubert).
2
See National Institute of Justice Investigative and Forensic Sciences, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/sciencetech/ifs.htm (last visited Nov. 26, 2004).
The Institute states: “The success achieved by DNA evidence in the criminal
justice system has raised the bar for all forensic disciplines. The criminal justice
community, as well as the general public, now carries the same high
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subjective and judgmental components, such as bite mark analysis,
are now subject to much greater skepticism and more searching
scrutiny.3
Even given these new expectations, however, how can
fingerprint analysis, so long the paradigm for human identification
and so apparently simple in concept, be subject to serious
question? The answer to this apparent paradox lies in recognizing
the distinction between a latent print (one taken from a crime
scene), and a rolled or inked print (a print taken under controlled
conditions, such as at a police station). Latent prints may exhibit
only a small portion of the surface of the finger and may be
smudged, distorted, or both, depending on how they were
deposited. For these reasons, latent prints are an “inevitable source
of error in making comparisons,” as they generally “contain less
clarity, less content, and less undistorted information than a
fingerprint taken under controlled conditions, and much, much less
detail compared to the actual patterns of ridges and grooves of a
finger.”4 (See Figure 1).

expectations for all forensic evidence.” Id.
3
See Flynn McRoberts & Steve Mills, From the Start, A Faulty Science,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 19, 2004, at A1. David Faigman, a Professor at the University
of California Hastings College of the Law and co-editor of Modern Scientific
Evidence, remarks, “I think bite marks probably ought to be the poster child for
bad forensic science.” Id.
4
Lyn Haber & Ralph N. Haber, Error Rates for Human Latent Fingerprint
Examiners, in AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION SYSTEMS 341 (Nalini
Ratha & Ruud Bolle eds., 2004).
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Figure 1: Fingerprint Comparisons5

Alex Garcia; Chicago Tribune

Alex Garcia; Chicago Tribune

Fig. 1(a) – Inked print

Fig. 1(b) – Latent print said to

of Richard Jackson

match the print in Fig. 1(a)

Another important reason for the increased scrutiny of
fingerprint evidence is the increasing number of documented
misidentifications based on fingerprint analysis.6 Such
misidentifications are of interest for several reasons: they illustrate
the subjective nature of fingerprint evidence; they directly
contradict a number of claims advanced by the fingerprint
profession; and they provide concrete illustrations of just what can
go wrong.

5

Images appear courtesy of the Chicago Tribune. The photographs were
taken by Alex Garcia and originally appeared in Flynn McRoberts et al.,
Forensics Under the Microscope: Unproven Techniques Sway Courts, Erode
Justice, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 2004, at A1.
6
See infra Part II; McRoberts et al., supra note 5; Simon Cole, The Myth of
Fingerprints, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, § 6 (Magazine) at 13.
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II. FINGERPRINT MISIDENTIFICATIONS: TWO CASE STUDIES
A. Commonwealth v. Cowans7
On May 30, 1997, an African-American male shot and
wounded Officer Gregory Gallagher of the Boston Police
Department while that officer was on duty.8 The assailant’s
baseball hat fell off during the initial struggle between the two
men.9 Shortly after the shooting, an African-American male
holding a gun gained entry into the nearby residence of Ms. Bonnie
Lacy.10 The individual removed his sweatshirt, wiped his gun off,
asked for and received a glass of water, and then left.11
Officer Gallagher later identified Mr. Stephan Cowans as his
assailant in a photographic lineup that included the pictures of
eight individuals.12 The officer also subsequently identified
Cowans in a standard lineup that included the suspect.13 A witness
who saw the presumed assailant shortly after the shooting
confirmed the identification, although Ms. Lacy did not.14 In
addition to the eyewitness evidence, investigators located a
fingerprint on the glass used by the individual who had gained
entry to Ms. Lacy’s house.15 The print was matched to that of Mr.
Cowans by two fingerprint examiners working for the Boston
Police Department.16 A fingerprint examiner retained by the
7

Commonwealth v. Cowans, 756 N.E.2d 622 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)
Id. at 624.
9
Jonathan Saltzman, Judge Sets Bail in DNA Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
22, 2004, at B4.
10
Cowans, 756 N.E.2d at 625.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Jonathan Saltzman, Judge Sets Bail in DNA Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
22, 2004, at B4. See also Jonathan Saltzman & Mac Daniel, Man Freed in 1997
Shooting of Officer Judge Gives Ruling After Fingerprint Revelation, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 24, 2004, at A1.
16
Jack Thomas, 2 Police Officers Are Put On Leave, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
8
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defense later confirmed the fingerprint match.17 On the basis of
this evidence, Mr. Cowans was convicted of shooting a police
officer and sentenced to thirty to forty-five years in state prison.18
In the pre-DNA world, Mr. Cowans would no doubt have spent
much of his adult life behind bars. However, in May 2003 (six
years after Cowans’s conviction), at the defendant’s request,
Orchid Cellmark Laboratories performed DNA testing on both the
glass and the baseball hat found at the crime scene.19 The DNA
profile found on the glass did not match that of Mr. Cowans, but it
did match that of the primary contributor to the DNA on the
baseball cap.20
In January 2004, at the request of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, further testing was performed on the sweatshirt.
The resulting DNA profile matched the common profile found on
the glass and the baseball hat.21 Initially, Suffolk Assistant District
Attorney David E. Meier stated that, given the “compelling”
evidence of the fingerprint on the glass, his office would retry
Cowans if the conviction were overturned.22 Two days later, after
the fingerprint had been re-examined, however, Meier changed his
mind.23 In addressing Superior Court Judge Peter Lauriat, Meier
explained that the fingerprint evidence presented at trial did not
match that of Cowans: “I can conclusively and unequivocally state,
your honor, that that purported match was a mistake.”24 Mr.
Cowans was then released, having spent six years in jail for a
24, 2004, at B1 (stating that two fingerprint technicians “testified that a
fingerprint lifted from a glass used by the assailant matched Cowans’s print”).
17
Interview with James Dilday, Partner, Grayer & Dilday (Apr. 19, 2004).
18
See Saltzman & Daniel, supra note 15.
19
Id.
20
The cap contained a mixture of two or more sources of DNA, but none of
these could have originated with Mr. Cowans. See Saltzman, supra note 9.
21
Jack Thomas, ‘I Was Not the Man Who Did This’ Cleared of Shooting
Charge, Stephan Cowans Looks Back at Six Years Lost in Prison, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 28, 2004, at F1. See also The Innocence Project, Stephen Cowans
Case Profile, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile.php?id=141 (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
22
Saltzman, supra note 9.
23
Id.
24
Saltzman & Daniel, supra note 15.
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crime he did not commit.25
B. The Mayfield Affair
On March 11, 2004, a terrorist bomb attack on a Madrid train
station resulted in 191 deaths and some 2,000 people injured.26 The
Spanish authorities found a bag of detonators near the site of the
explosion with a fingerprint on it that did not match any in their
databank.27 The authorities forwarded the print to several
investigative organizations, including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). After searching its fingerprint database, the
FBI located a possible match in the prints of Mr. Brandon
Mayfield, an attorney in Portland, Oregon.28
From the start, there were troubling aspects about the match.
Mr. Mayfield had ties to Muslim individuals and organizations
thought to make him suspect, but there was no evidence that he
had been out of the country for many years.29 Nevertheless, the
FBI examiners concluded that the print was a “100 percent positive
identification,” and so informed the Spanish authorities on April 2,
2004.30
The Spanish disagreed. On April 13, 2004, the Spanish
authorities reported in a memorandum to the FBI that the match
was “conclusively negative.”31 Where the FBI found fifteen points
of agreement for the fingerprint, the Spanish found only seven.32

25

Id.
See Elaine Sciolino, Ten Bombs Shatter Trains in Madrid, Killing 192,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2004, at A1.
27
Susan Schmidt & Blaine Harden, Lawyer’s Fingerprint Linked to
Bombing Bag, Detonators Found in Stolen Van in Spain, WASH. POST, May 8,
2004, at A3.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint
Individualization in the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 706, 710.
31
Sarah Kershaw, Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2004, at A1.
32
Id.
26
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Nevertheless, the FBI continued to maintain that the latent print on
the bag matched that of Mr. Mayfield and arranged a meeting with
Spanish officials in Madrid on April 21, 2004 to present their
analysis. The meeting did nothing to change the opinion of the FBI
and, subsequently, Mr. Mayfield was arrested on May 6, 2004 on a
material witness warrant.33
Fortunately for Mr. Mayfield, the Spanish authorities persisted
with their investigation and, shortly after Mayfield’s arrest,
announced that they had matched the latent print to an Algerian
named Ouhnane Daoud.34 The final blow came when the Spanish
authorities “found traces of Daoud’s DNA in a rural cottage
outside Madrid where investigators believe the terrorist cell held
planning sessions and assembled the backpack bombs used in the
attack.”35 Mr. Mayfield was finally released after spending two
weeks in jail.36
What went wrong? FBI officials initially gave conflicting
accounts. In June 2004, The New York Times reported on the
agency’s changing positions:
F.B.I. officials told Congress members in the briefings last
week that they had come up with the match after working
off a ‘second-generation’ digital print—meaning a copy of
a copy. But they gave a somewhat different explanation in
interviews this week, saying they were now uncertain what
generation the digital print represented. But the F.B.I.
official who spoke to The New York Times on condition of
anonymity added that the real issue was the quality of the
latent print that the Spaniards originally took from the blue
bag.
The determination by an F.B.I. examiner that the print was
useable was hasty and erroneous, F.B.I. officials said, and
33

Id.
Susan Schmidt, Oregon Lawyer’s Status Remains Murky, WASH. POST,
May 22, 2004, at A2.
35
Tomas Alex Tizon et al., Critics Galvanized by Oregon Lawyer’s Case,
L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at A13.
36
David Heath & Hal Bernton, Portland Lawyer Released in Probe of
Spain Bombings, SEATTLE TIMES, May 21, 2004, at A1.
34
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set the agency off in the wrong direction and corrupted the
rest of the process. 37
Neither of these conflicting explanations is satisfactory. Latent
prints of any type, digitized or not, almost always involve elements
of distortion and a loss of information; part of an examiner’s
claimed expertise is the ability to determine precisely when a latent
is useable, and the FBI, in particular, has extensive experience,
going back a decade, in the use of digitized prints. 38 The basic rule
is supposed to be that if there is any doubt regarding the purported
match, an identification is not reported. Either that did not happen
in Mayfield, or erroneous identifications are possible, even when
examiners have (or express) no doubt about the identification.
Nor is the “quality of the latent print that the Spanish originally
took” an adequate explanation for the error, given that Spanish
authorities had no difficulty in determining from the outset that the
latent did not match Mr. Mayfield’s print. Instead, the explanation
seems to lie elsewhere. David Ashbaugh, in his highly regarded
book Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge Analysis, notes:
Experienced identification specialists have learned through
training and practice the limits of how much distortion or
difference is still considered within the parameters of
agreement. For the benefit of those who do not have much
experience, if each area of friction ridge detail being
compared requires justification for why the formation
appears slightly different or why it is not spatially correct,
be cautious, one may be talking oneself into agreement that
is not really there.39
It would appear that a situation similar to the one Ashbaugh
describes occurred in the Mayfield case.
In responding to the investigative methods used by the FBI in
the Madrid bombing case, Pedro Luis Melida Lledo, head of the
37

Kershaw, supra note 31, at A1.
See Christopher Brislawn, Fingerprints Go Digital, 42 NOTICES AM.
MATHEMATICAL SOC’Y 1278 (1995).
39
DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE FRICTION RIDGE
ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED RIDGEOLOGY 146
(1999) (emphasis added).
38
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Spanish National Police’s fingerprint unit, noted, “They had a
justification for everything . . . [b]ut I just couldn’t see it.”40
According to Melida, Mayfield’s print differed from the latent
found on the blue bag both in that the arcs on the lower portion of
his print pointed downward rather than upward, as they did in the
latent, and in the number of concentric rings (or crests) that were
visible to investigators.41 Melida offered the following analogy for
what might have happened to the FBI investigators:
You’re trying to match a woman’s face to a picture . . .
[b]ut you see that woman has a mole, and the face in the
picture doesn’t. Well, maybe it’s covered up with make-up,
you say. O.K., but the woman has straight hair and it’s
curly in the picture. Maybe the woman in the picture had a
permanent?42
Other examples of fingerprint misidentifications are known.
(The inked and rolled prints in Figure 1, for example, furnish
another instance.)43 As the Mayfield case illustrates, the process of
comparing latent and inked prints is inherently subjective and
subject to error, and an awareness of the perils implicit in such an
approach is a requisite first step in considering possible remedies.
Understanding how some of the FBI’s most senior examiners
could have persuaded themselves that the two prints matched is
perhaps best achieved, however, in a more general context, to
which we now turn.

40

Kershaw, supra note 31, at A1.
Id.
42
Id.
43
See Mary Anne Janco, Murder Case is Formally Dropped: Richard
Jackson’s Fingerprints Did Not Match Those Found at the Scene, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 8, 2000, at B1; Anne Barnard, Convicted in Slaying, Man Wins
Freedom: An FBI Investigation Found that Fingerprints at Murder Scene Were
Not Those of Richard Jackson, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 24, 1999, at B1; Mary
Anne Janco, Release of Convicted Killer is Sought, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 24,
1999, at B1; Rachel Scheier, New Trial Sought in U. Darby Slaying: A
Prosecution Fingerprint Expert’s Testimony is in Question, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Aug. 16, 1999, at B1.
41
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III. THE NEED FOR SCIENCE
Because the requirements for scientific rigor are so demanding,
let us pause briefly to discuss why they exist. Science is not just
one of several competing, equally valid forms of knowledge.
Scientific procedures have evolved, and science is accorded great
respect precisely because it is recognized that one can only obtain
truly reliable knowledge by using its protocols and practices.
Suppose that a scientist is testing a particular procedure having
a claimed effect. For example, consider a case in which a new
medication or a new surgical procedure claims to be superior to an
old medication or surgical procedure. There are two important
elements in the design of a scientifically valid experiment to test
this. The experiment should employ controls, and the individuals
or units being tested should be randomly allocated to the treatment
and control groups. The allocation should be random in order to
eliminate any possible bias in assigning individuals to the two
groups. Ideally, the evaluation should also be blind: both the
evaluator and the subject should not be told whether the subject is
in the treatment or control group.44 There are many examples in the
scientific literature illustrating the importance of properly designed
experiments; the following case is particularly instructive.
A. The Portacaval Shunt45
The portacaval shunt was a surgical procedure thought for
several years to be effective in treating cirrhosis of the liver by
redirecting blood flow. After many studies in support of the
procedure had been published in medical journals, Grace, Muench,
and Chalmers published a review of the studies.46 Their analysis
examined the structure of fifty-one portacaval shunt studies and the
conclusions reported in each paper regarding the shunt’s
44

The nature of the evaluation may make blinding impossible, however.
See DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 8-9 (3d ed. 1997). This
outstanding textbook contains a number of other instructive examples of this
nature.
46
N. D. Grace et al., The Present Status of Shunts for Portal Hypertension
in Cirrhosis, 50 GASTROENTEROLOGY 684 (1966).
45
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effectiveness. The results of the fifty-one studies are summarized
below.
Design of Experiment

Degree of Enthusiasm for Procedure
Marked

Moderate

None

No Controls

24

7

1

Nonrandomized controls

10

3

2

Randomized controls

0

1

3

The results are instructive when enthusiasm for the shunt
procedure is compared to whether or not the design of the
experiment employed controls and, if so, which type. It is apparent
from the table that the procedure has little, if any, value: when
controls were employed and allocated in a random fashion to
treatment and control groups, three of the four studies with
controls found no evidence of the procedure’s effectiveness. Most
of the studies, however, were poorly designed: thirty-two of the
fifty-one did not employ controls at all, and fifteen of the nineteen
that did use controls failed to use randomization to allocate
subjects to the treatment and control groups. As a result, most of
the studies got it wrong: 75% of the studies without controls
expressed marked enthusiasm for the procedure, as did 66% of
those that employed nonrandomized controls.
What is going on here? In brief, it is a well-understood
phenomenon that the human mind often sees what it expects to see,
hopes to see, or wants to see.47 The reason science requires
rigorous standards of testing is precisely because strongly held
beliefs and expert opinions do not always withstand scrutiny or
comparisons to serious objective competitors. This is not simply a
case of science versus non-science. In the past, spectacular

47

It should be stressed that this is a separate phenomenon from deliberate
fraud. In the phenomenon we are discussing, there is deception at work, but it is
self-deception.
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examples of nonexistent phenomena, such as N-rays, polywater,
and cold fusion, have been reported and maintained by many
investigators until serious peer review revealed the claims to be
erroneous.48 The failure to follow proper procedures, even or
especially by scientists, can have serious consequences.
B. Clinical v. Statistical Prediction
A related phenomenon is that of clinical versus statistical
prediction. A classic study performed by Paul Meehl found that the
predictions of experts based on clinical interviews were often far
less accurate than predictions based on statistical or actuarial
instruments.49 Although experts are often more comfortable relying
on their instincts, this reliance does not always translate into
superior predictive ability.50
A related point is the distinction between the scientific uses of
the terms “reliability” and “validity.” A measurement procedure is
said to be reliable if, when repeated, it gives rise to the same result.
It is, in other words, consistent. In contrast, a procedure is said to
be valid if it measures what it claims to measure. For example, in
the popular Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification
(ACE-V) paradigm for fingerprint identification,51 the verification
stage, in which a second examiner confirms the assessment of the
original examiner, may increase the consistency of the
assessments. But while the verification stage has implications for
the reliability of latent print comparisons, it does not assure their
validity.

48

See, e.g., Irving Klotz, The N-ray Affair, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, May
1980; FELIX FRANKS, POLYWATER (1981); GARY TAUBES, BAD SCIENCE: THE
SHORT LIFE AND WEIRD TIMES OF COLD FUSION (1983).
49
PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE (Jason Aronson ed.,
Univ. of Minn. Press 1996) (1954).
50
Anne M. Heinz et al., Sentencing By Parole Board: An Evaluation, 67 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1-31 (1976) (discussing the phenomenon in the
context of parole decisions).
51
See, ASHBAUGH, supra note 39, at 196.
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IV. FINGERPRINT OPINIONS
Suppose that a latent print and a rolled print are judged to be a
match by an examiner. Such fingerprint identifications can be
thought of as implicitly making several assertions based on the
knowledge and experience of the examiner. First, through an
identification an examiner suggests that the latent print and the
rolled prints could have a common source; that is, although no pair
of latent and rolled prints is ever identical, the examiner concludes
on the basis of his knowledge and experience that the differences
between the latent and rolled prints fall within the expected or
possible range of variation. Second, an identification indicates that
the latent and rolled prints exhibit a degree of similarity
substantially greater than one ordinarily sees in pairs of prints
coming from different individuals. Such a judgment in principle
also reflects the accumulated knowledge and experience of the
examiner, even though, in practice, an examiner might not have
actually seen very many “near misses.” Lastly, the examiner
asserts that only one person in the world could be the source of the
latent print.
This last assertion is problematic because, unlike the first two,
it is difficult to determine what precise knowledge or experience
on the part of an examiner could serve as the basis for such a
conclusion. Ashbaugh describes the process:
An opinion of individualization is unambiguous. The
details in both prints are in agreement and, in the opinion of
the identification specialist, there is sufficient uniqueness
[sic] present in the friction ridge detail to eliminate all other
possible donors. This opinion is subjective and it is based
on the knowledge and experience of the examiner.52
There are obvious questions about such an approach. Suppose that
the fingerprint examiner is wrong and that, rather than there being
a unique “match,” instead 1 in 1,000,000 persons have fingerprints
bearing as great a degree of similarity to a particular latent print as
the particular fingerprint in question. How could an examiner
distinguish between these two scenarios based on his knowledge
52

Id. at 146.
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and experience? The world would look basically the same; people
do not usually see events that happen only 1 in 1,000,000 times.
How does an investigator, based on personal experience,
discriminate between 1 in 1,000,000 and zero? The examiners in
Mayfield thought they knew, but obviously they did not.53
“How much correspondence between two fingerprints is
sufficient to conclude that they were both made by the same
finger?”54 David Stoney, a distinguished expert on fingerprints,
tells us:
An adequate answer to [this question] is not currently
available. The best answer at present to the question ‘How
much is enough?’ is that this is up to the individual expert
fingerprint examiner to determine, based on that examiner’s
training, skill, and experience. Thus we have an ill-defined,
flexible, and explicitly subjective criterion for establishing
fingerprint identification . . . .
Any unbiased, intelligent assessment of fingerprint
identification practices today reveals that there are, in
reality, no standards. That is, the amount of correspondence
in fraction ridge detail that is necessary for a conclusion of
identity has not been established.55
A declaration that a fingerprint match has occurred is essentially a
statistical statement. As the detail available in a latent fingerprint
increases, fewer and fewer people will have consistent fingerprints:
first, 1 in 10, then 1 in 1000, and, finally, 1 in 1,000,000. Based on
intuition, the examiner thinks he knows where to draw the line, but
the question remains: what is the justification for such a judgment?

53

The advent in recent years of computer-searchable databanks of digitized
prints may well have played some role here; a match criterion unlikely to
generate false positives when used by an examiner fifty years ago while
searching a databank numbering in the tens of thousands might well generate
false positives when searching a modern database numbering in the tens of
millions.
54
David A. Stoney, Measurement of Fingerprint Individuality, in
ADVANCES IN FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 327, 329 (Henry C. Lee & Robert E.
Gaensslen eds., 2d ed. 2001).
55
Id. at 329-30.
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A. Comparing Identification Techniques: Fingerprints v. DNA
Analysis
The scientific process for analyzing DNA stands in contrast to
the intuitive process for identifying fingerprint matches. A
comparison of the two techniques is instructive. Consider the
following steps in the presentation and analysis of both types of
evidence:
DNA

Fingerprints

DNA is unique

Fingerprints are unique

Only a portion of genome
examined

Latent only a partial print

Thirteen loci examined

Friction ridge detail identified

Statistical calculation

Subjective judgment

Because the totality of each person’s DNA is unique,
examining the human genome can potentially enable us to identify
a person. But practical considerations of time and expense limit us
to examining only a small portion of the genome. Current forensic
practice usually entails looking at a total of thirteen loci (locations
on the twenty-three pairs of chromosome found in human cells),
and the degree of rarity of the resulting DNA profile is
scientifically determined by means of a statistical population
genetic calculation.
There is an obvious parallel between DNA and fingerprint
analysis—up to a point. It is claimed that fingerprints, the friction
ridge detail on the surface of the skin, have the theoretical ability
to uniquely identify a person.56 Unfortunately, however, fingerprint
examiners are often faced with the Aristotelian reality of a latent
56

See, e.g., FRANCIS GALTON, FINGERPRINTS (1892); STEPHEN M. STIGLER,
Galton and Identification by Fingerprints, in STATISTICS ON THE TABLE 131-40
(1999).

ZABELL MACRO CORRECTED TUES 3-14-05.DOC

158

3/15/2005 12:34 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

print rather than the Platonic ideal of a pristine inked print. The
analysis of latent prints rests on an examination of Galton points of
comparison (or, more generally, “friction ridge detail”)—the
fingerprint analogues of the short tandem repeat (STR) loci used in
modern forensic DNA analysis. It is here that the apparent parallel
between fingerprint analysis and DNA analysis intersects reality.
In contrast to the scientifically-based statistical calculations
performed by a forensic scientist in analyzing DNA profile
frequencies, each fingerprint examiner renders an opinion as to the
similarity of friction ridge detail based on his subjective
judgment.57
In order to better understand this fundamental difference in the
two identification procedures, it is important to consider in detail
the steps involved in each. The next section discusses the statistical
calculation of DNA profile frequencies and compares the steps in
that process to the corresponding steps in fingerprint analysis.
V. COMPUTING DNA PROFILE FREQUENCIES
Current forensic DNA technology in the United States is
commonly based on the determination of a thirteen-locus DNA
profile. A typical example of such a DNA profile is given on the
next page:

57

The statistical calculation of a DNA profile involves the multiple steps of
collecting a database, estimating allele frequencies using the database, testing
the database for Hardy-Weinberg and linkage equilibrium, using the so-called
“product rule” to compute a combined profile frequency, using population
genetic adjustments to correct for possible population substructure, and
sometimes even attaching confidence limits to the resulting estimate.
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Table 1: A Typical Thirteen Locus DNA Profile
Locus

Profile

D3S1358

16, 18

VWA

15, 20

FGA

24, 26

D8S1179

14, 15

D21S11

28, 30

D18S51

10, 16

D5S818

10, 13

D7S820

11, 11

D13S317

12, 15

D16S539

9, 14

THO1

6, 8

TPOX

6, 8

CSF1PO

7, 8
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Forensic scientists determine DNA profiles and profile
frequencies using a number of steps.58 First, we know through
research that at various points on the chromosomes, short
sequences of nucleotides are repeated in tandem, one after another.
These sequences are known as short tandem repeats (STRs). The
exact number of repeats varies from one individual to another, but
is constant for a given person. For example, consider the locus
designated D3S1358. In this example, we are concerned with the
DNA on chromosome 3 (hence the “D3”). The DNA profile for an
individual at this location (or “locus”) might be 16, 18, indicating
that at one of the many possible locations where short tandem
repeats occur on chromosome 3, here, at location number 1358,
one of the chromosomes of the pair contains the repeated sequence
16 times, and the other, 18 times. The 16 and the 18 are determined
objectively using computer software that generates an
electropherogram, a printout that looks somewhat like an EKG and
exhibits a sequence of peaks. The presence of a peak indicates the
presence of a repeat of a given size.
After the DNA profile of interest has been established, a
previously collected database of DNA profiles is consulted and the
frequencies of occurrence of the different repeat sizes (or “alleles”)
in the DNA profile of interest are determined. (The term “allele”
refers to a possible state of the DNA at a given locus. In the
example above, the 16 and 18 are two different alleles.) For
example, in the case of locus D3S1358, an FBI database indicates
that among 203 Caucasian individuals having a total of 406 alleles,
the 16 allele occurs 94 times and the 18 allele occurs 66 times.
Thus, the frequency of the 16 allele among Caucasians in the
United States is estimated to be 94/406, or 23%, and the frequency
of the 18 allele is estimated to be 66/406, or 16%.
The frequency of the joint occurrence of the 16, 18 “genotype”
is then estimated using a formula that states that the frequency is
twice the product of the individual allele frequencies (2 x 23% x

58

See JOHN M. BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY AND
TECHNOLOGY BEHIND STR MARKERS 25 (2001); IAN W. EVETT & BRUCE S.
WEIR, INTERPRETING DNA EVIDENCE: STATISTICAL GENETICS FOR FORENSIC
SCIENTISTS (1998).
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16%, or approximately 7%).59 The use of this formula is justified
by a finding that the population is in at least approximate “HardyWeinberg” equilibrium.60 The specifics of “Hardy-Weinberg”
equilibrium will not be discussed here, but it is important to note
that the presence or absence of equilibrium, at least approximately,
is a fact amenable to scientific determination by the use of
appropriate statistical tests. Because there was some initial
controversy regarding the forensic use of DNA, the National
Academy of Sciences, through its operating arm the National
Research Council (NRC), convened two panels that issued reports
(one in 1992 and one in 1996) on the subject. One of the key
findings of the second NRC panel report on forensic DNA is that
the use of the above product formula (subject to certain caveats
and population genetic adjustments, depending on the
circumstances) is scientifically justified.61
Similarly, in the case of the vWA locus, the 15 allele occurs
among Caucasians approximately 44/392, or 11% of the time, and
the 20 allele occurs 4/392, or 1% of the time. Thus, the 15, 20
profile occurs 2 x 11% x 1% = 0.22% of the time, or
approximately 1 in every 455 times.
Finally, the examiner must determine how unusual it is for a
person to have the overall profile at all thirteen loci. In order to
compute this, an examiner uses a second product rule that requires
the multiplication of profile frequencies at each separate locus. For
example, if an examiner knew only the profiles for D3S1358 and
vWA, he would multiply the frequencies for both the 16, 18 at
D3S1358 and the 15, 20 at vWA, that is, 0.22% x 7% = 0.0154%,
or about 1 in 6500 times. The scientific justification for this
formula lies in a determination that the population is in “linkage,”
or gametic, equilibrium. Once again, this fact is amenable to
scientific determination and the second NRC report concludes that,
59

Twice because there are two possible ways the profile could arise,
depending on which alleles the mother and the father contribute. Thus, the
mother could contribute the 16 and the father the 18, or vice versa.
60
BRUCE S. WEIR, GENETIC DATA ANALYSIS II: METHODS FOR DISCRETE
POPULATION GENETIC DATA 92-103 (1996).
61
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE (1996).
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subject to certain caveats alluded to earlier, the formula’s use is
scientifically justified.62
Certain elements of approximation occur in the above
calculations; for example, profile frequencies are based on
estimates derived from samples, the populations in question may
not be in complete equilibrium, and relatives might be possible
contributors. Adjustments and corrections are available to account
for all of these possibilities.
In contrast, the fingerprint examination process enjoys none of
the statistical qualities of DNA analysis. “Galton points,” or
elements of friction ridge detail, are not objectively determined
quantities. For example, as noted above, in the Mayfield case, the
FBI claimed fifteen matching points, while the Spanish found only
seven.63 Indeed, as forensic scientists Christophe Champod and Ian
Evett emphasize, point requirements only provide an illusory form
of transparency to the identification process.64 This lack of
objectivity in the determination of points formed an important part
of the argument in the influential 1996 paper of Evett and Ray
Williams, a paper that played a key role in leading the United
Kingdom to eventually abandon its sixteen-point standard.65
Similarly, there are no analogues in the realm of fingerprint
evidence to the collection of databases for the purpose of
computing allele and DNA profile frequencies. Although
examiners have a general sense of which fingerprint characteristics
are common and which are rare, the judgments inherent in this
work are not based on published statistical studies and methods do
not exist for estimating the rarity of latent prints. Instead, as noted
by Stoney, the identification process appeals primarily to the
experience, training, and expertise of the examiner.
Consider, for example, the following candid admission by
Robert D. Olson, Sr.:
62

Id.
Kershaw, supra note 31, at A1.
64
Christophe Champod & Ian W. Evett, A Probabilistic Approach to
Fingerprint Evidence, 51 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 101, 101-22 (2001).
65
See Ian W. Evett & Ray L. Williams, A Review of the Sixteen Point
Fingerprint Standard in England and Wales, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION
49, 49-73 (1996).
63
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All training programs for latent print examiners place great
emphasis on practical experience during the phases of
instruction regarding the evaluation and comparison of
latent prints. This emphasis is well founded and has
considerable merit, but it has been stressed so heavily that
little written information exists regarding the
methodologies and procedures for making a comparison of
two prints. This lack of information has resulted in . . . the
failure of many persons to recognize the scientific nature of
latent print identification.66
The last sentence of the quotation is a contradiction in terms. Olson
describes a master-apprentice form of mentoring and, whatever
else such an arrangement might be, it is not science. The failure to
publish specific “methodologies and procedures” is totally
antithetical to good scientific practice and renders impossible any
form of critical external review.
VI. UNIQUENESS
It is often asserted that fingerprints are unique. This is really
asking the wrong question. A comparison to a similar issue in the
interpretation of DNA evidence is instructive. Before DNA
evidence is introduced in court, an expert sometimes states that
every person’s DNA (except that of identical twins) is unique to
that person. Such a statement is true, but also misleading. The
current systems used to type DNA, as noted earlier, examine only a
very small portion of the human genome. It is not the unrealized
potential of the entire genome, but the statistical calculations
regarding the small fraction examined that informs us about the
strength of the evidence. Similarly, the issue in fingerprint
identification is not whether the surface of the human finger
theoretically contains enough information to permit unique
identification, but whether the latent print being used in a specific

66

Robert D. Olson, Sr. & Henry C. Lee, Identification of Latent Prints, in
ADVANCES OF FINGERPRINT TECHNOLOGY 41-61 (Henry C. Lee & Robert E.
Gaensslen eds., 2d ed. 2001).
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case is sufficient to arrive at such a conclusion.67
Although there is a substantial literature on the uniqueness of
fingerprints,68 it is surprising how little true scientific support for
the proposition exists. “From a statistical viewpoint, the scientific
foundation for fingerprint individuality is incredibly weak.”69
Several studies have attempted to propose statistical models for
fingerprint identification. The most recent of these studies is an
FBI-sponsored study performed by Meagher, Budowle, and Ziesig
(MBZ).70 In the MBZ study, the digital images of 50,000
fingerprints were selected and all possible pairwise comparisons
were made (including the comparison of an image with itself),
using an unspecified quantitative measure of similarity. In each
case it was found, not surprisingly, that the image of a fingerprint
was far more similar to itself than any of the others and the
probability of a fortuitous match occurring was estimated based on
the similarity score used by MBZ. The MBZ study concluded: The
probability of any non-mate fingerprint being identical to any

67

Of course, the answer to the first question is not irrelevant because it tells
us whether an affirmative answer to the second question is even possible.
68
See, e.g., Galton, supra note 56; Stoney, supra note 54; David H. Kaye,
The Non-Science of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera-Plaza, 21
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1073 (2003).
69
Stoney, supra note 54, at 383. Stoney’s paper provides an outstanding
and comprehensive review of the existing literature on the uniqueness of
fingerprints. However, Stoney’s conclusions about the nature of these past
studies are depressing. Stoney writes:
Beginning with Galton and extending through Meagher, Budowle, and
Ziesig, there have been a dozen or so statistical models proposed. These
vary considerably in their complexity, but in general there has been
much speculation and little data. Champod’s work is perhaps the
exception, bringing forth the first realistic means to predict frequencies
of occurrence of specific combinations of ridge minutiae.
Id.
70
For detailed discussions of the MBZ study, see Stoney, supra note 54, at
378-83; David H. Kaye, Questioning a Courtroom Proof of the Uniqueness of
Fingerprints, 71 INT’L STAT. REV. 521 (2003); Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering
Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Rulings from Jennings to Llera Plaza and
Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1226–1231 (2004) [hereinafter Cole,
Grandfathering Evidence].
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particular fingerprint is 1/1097 (1 followed by 97 zeroes).71
This FBI-sponsored study has been justly attacked on several
grounds. First and foremost, even if one were to compare rolled
prints rather than latent prints, the appropriate comparison would
be the degree of similarity between two different prints from the
same individual versus two prints from different, randomly
selected individuals. As Professor David Kaye notes:
[T]he study merely demonstrates the trivial fact that the
same two-dimensional representation of the surface of a
finger is far more similar to itself than to such a
representation of the surface of a finger from any other
person in the data set. As such it ignores the fact that two
prints rolled successively from the same individual are not
identical . . . .72
Dr. Stoney also criticized the FBI study on similar grounds, noting
that “[t]here would never be an occasion to compare a single
fingerprint to itself.”73
Obviously the more relevant study would have been to
compare instead distinct pairs of prints coming from 50,000
different individuals, each individual contributing two prints. This
could be thought of as modeling a search of the Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) database of inked prints
using the inked print of a suspect whose prints might be in AFIS
under a different name due to a prior offense. However, the still far
more informative study would have been to compare latent prints
to target rolled prints.

71

Stoney, supra note 54, at 379.
Kaye, supra note 68, at 527. David Stoney agrees with Kaye:
The Meagher, Budowle, and Ziesig experiments do not include
comparing two different prints of the same finger with each other. All
actual fingerprint comparisons have this aspect, and every fingerprint
examiner knows that no two impressions from the same finger are
exactly alike . . . .

72

The model, therefore, makes an extremely elementary, fundamental
mistake.
Stoney, supra note 54, at 380-81.
73
Stoney, supra note 54, at 380-81.
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In fact, the FBI study did attempt to address the latent versus
inked print issue by using cropped versions of the inked prints as
surrogates for latent prints. Once again, this aspect of the FBI
study has been harshly criticized; the use of a portion of an inked
print to represent a latent print is totally misleading because latent
prints in general suffer not only from a loss of information, but
also distortions in the deposited image.74 In his critique of the FBI
study, Dr. Stoney explained that it “employed the thoroughly
discredited practice of using subsets of inked prints to simulate
latent prints.”75 For this and other reasons, Dr. Stoney concluded
that the study was deeply flawed and “highly misleading” and
concluded that “it [was] remarkable that a study with such
fundamental flaws was presented in court.”76
Both Professor Kaye and Dr. Stoney are far from alone in their
harsh criticism of the FBI study. Champod and Evett, for example,
declared “entirely unsupportable” the study’s conclusion that the
probability of a random print being identical to a particular
fingerprint is 1 in 1097, commenting, “The figure of 10-97
[computed by MBZ] so transcends reality that we are amazed that
it was admitted into evidence.”77
Curiously, as Professor Kaye notes, an initial oversight on the
part of the authors of the MBZ study inadvertently permitted one
to compare a small number of rolled prints from the same
individual.78 This was because it turned out that the 50,000 prints
did not, in fact, all come from 50,000 different individuals; in a

74

This loss of information is due to the fact that only a portion of the finger
may leave a print.
75
Stoney, supra note 54, at 382-83.
76
Id. Stoney elaborates on his criticism: “It was specifically designed to
“prove the uniqueness” of fingerprints in a Daubert hearing, and incorporates a
profound ignorance of both forensic science and statistics. Perhaps the most
remarkable aspect of these experiments is that they continue to be introduced in
such hearings.” Id.
77
See Champod & Evett, supra note 64. For statistical aficionados, the
MBZ calculation makes the absurd assumption that one can accurately calculate
probabilities more than twenty standard deviations in the tail of an
approximately normal distribution.
78
Kaye, supra note 68, at 1079.
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small number of cases, some of the prints were, in fact, duplicate
prints taken from the same individual. These duplicate pairs
(although of course still fairly similar) were sufficiently dissimilar
to suggest that one might well see comparable pairs of prints
exhibiting a comparable level of similarity coming from different
individuals, provided only that a large enough group of prints were
examined.79
VII. PROFICIENCY TESTS
Despite the absence of objective standards, scientific
validation, and adequate statistical studies, a natural question to
ask is how well fingerprint examiners actually perform.
Proficiency tests do not validate a procedure per se, but they can
provide some insight into error rates. In 1995, the Collaborative
Testing Service (CTS) administered a proficiency test that, for the
first time, was “designed, assembled, and reviewed” by the
International Association for Identification (IAI).80 The results
were disappointing. Four suspect cards with prints of all ten fingers
were provided together with seven latents.81 Of 156 people taking
the test, only 68 (44%) correctly classified all seven latents.82
Overall, the tests contained a total of 48 incorrect identifications.83
David Grieve, the editor of the Journal of Forensic Identification,
describes the reaction of the forensic community to the results of
the CTS test as ranging from “shock to disbelief,”84 and added:
Errors of this magnitude within a discipline singularly
admired and respected for its touted absolute certainty as an
identification process have produced chilling and mindnumbing realities. Thirty-four participants, an incredible
22% of those involved, substituted presumed but false
79

Of course, this depends on the particular type of AFIS software being

used.
80

David Grieve, Possession of Truth, 46 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 521,
523 (1996).
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 525.
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certainty for truth. By any measure, this represents a profile
of practice that is unacceptable and thus demands positive
action by the entire community.85
What is striking about these comments is that they do not come
from a critic of the fingerprint community, but from the editor of
one of its premier publications.86
It is important to recognize the limits of the information
provided by proficiency tests. Properly designed proficiency tests
may give some sense of the possible magnitude of errors in
casework on the part of examiners, but they do not provide
scientific validation for assertions that a pattern is unique in the
human population. Such tests are most useful when they are
external and blind, that is, the examiners do not have an interest in
the outcome of the test and the individuals being examined do not
know that they are being tested. For precisely the same reasons, if
a fingerprint match is being verified by a second examiner, the
second examiner should not know the conclusion of the first
examiner or other facts about the case that might affect his
judgment. For example, in the Cowans case, the knowledge that a
fellow officer had been shot, had an unobstructed view of the
assailant, and had positively identified the suspect may have
influenced the judgment of subsequent examiners looking at the
latent print on the glass.
VIII.VALIDATION
The fingerprint community appears to believe that past
performance provides a form of validation. The community claims
that fingerprints have been used successfully for a nearly a century
in the United States and, despite the millions of prints on file with
85

Id.
The results of subsequent tests have not been quite as poor in terms of
erroneous identifications, but still have an error rate in the neighborhood of
10%. The improvement may reflect additional conservatism on the part of the
test takers rather than changes in actual practice. For further discussion of
subsequent tests, see Lyn Haber & Ralph N. Haber, Error Rates for Human
Latent Fingerprint Examiners, in AUTOMATIC FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION
SYSTEMS 339-60 (Nalini Ratha & Ruud Bolle eds., 2004).
86
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the FBI, no matching pair coming from a distinct source is known
to exist. However, these arguments do not inspire confidence.
First, it need hardly be said that mere courtroom use does not
constitute validation. In a case in which there are twenty-five
witnesses to a shooting and the assailant is pinned to the ground,
finding a matching print tells us little. The real focus should be on
errors in cases in which fingerprint evidence played a key or even
decisive role. A conviction in such a case does not validate the
identification because the conviction itself was presumably a direct
result of the fingerprint evidence.
In the pre-DNA era, finding new evidence to establish that a
conviction was erroneous was a formidable undertaking. At
present, however, the use of DNA for purposes of human
identification has radically altered the playing field. As of June
2002, DNA testing has resulted in the exoneration of at least 108
Americans.87 The realization that there is potentially a substantial
error rate in death penalty convictions, many of these discovered
because of post-conviction DNA testing, has led to a statewide
moratorium on the death penalty in Illinois.88 Thus, far from being
surprising, it was perhaps inevitable that the solid science of
forensic DNA identification would begin to play a role in
identifying erroneous fingerprint matches. This was certainly true
for the Cowans case in Boston and may also have played a role in
the Mayfield case.
These two cases may merely be the harbinger of things to
come. In forensic DNA testing, fingerprint examiners face, for the
first time, a competing form of evidence that both the public and
their own colleagues in law enforcement will certainly favor as
being both more scientifically based and more credible. That being
said, we still do not know the actual rate of error for fingerprint
identification in criminal cases. As Donald Kennedy, the editor-in87

Confidence in Criminal Justice Act of 2002: Hearing on S. 2446 Before
the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Barry
Scheck, Co-founder, The Innocence Project, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law), available at 2002 WL 20318239.
88
Press Release, State of Illinois Governor’s Office, Governor Ryan
Declares Moratorium on Executions, Will Appoint Commission to Review
Capital Punishment System (Jan. 31, 2000) (on file with author).
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chief of Science, notes, “It’s not that fingerprint analysis is
unreliable [but] . . . that its reliability is unverified by either
statistical models of fingerprint variation or by consistent data on
error rates.”89
The argument that no latent print has ever been found to match
the rolled print of a different person is similarly misleading
because no systematic search for such pairs on the entire databank
of millions of fingerprints has ever been performed. Moreover, the
Mayfield case arguably provides a counterexample to the claim
that no two inked prints can match the same latent; the FBI only
retreated after Spanish authorities identified a superior candidate.90
The deeply disturbing question is whether Mr. Mayfield would
have ever been exonerated had the terrorist act taken place in the
United States, rather than Spain, and had Mr. Daoud’s print not
been discovered.91
Unfortunately, current practice can make it difficult to identify
potentially competing candidates for matches. In one California
jurisdiction, a match to a latent was found by an AFIS search. The
software generated ten candidate fingerprints, one of which was
identified as a match to the latent. However, the information
regarding the other nine prints was discarded and, it was claimed,
could not be recovered. Such a procedure prevents independent
experts from determining whether another print might match as
well as or better than that of the candidate originally identified.
Several problems complicate true validation. First and
foremost, there is the absence of any objective standard. Many
examiners believe that such standards cannot be achieved and that
no objective set of criteria can capture the full detail available in a
fingerprint. Even if true, and the clinical-statistical prediction
debate seems relevant here, it remains unclear how far one could
get with objective measures. One possibility is to advocate explicit
probabilistic measures of rarity. These measures would have the

89

Donald Kennedy, Editorial, Neuroscience and Neuroethics, 302 SCIENCE
1625, 1625 (2003).
90
See supra II.B.
91
It is important to keep in mind that three senior examiners of the FBI and
an independent outside examiner all signed on to the match.
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merits of objectivity, transparency, and verifiability.92 Moreover, it
may be unnecessary to design an automated procedure to extract
all of the information related to a single fingerprint, given that
DNA analysis functions successfully with only a very small
portion of the genetic information available. For example, pattern
recognition experts Pankanti, Prabhakar, and Jain report:
Our results show that (1) contrary to the popular belief,
fingerprint matching is not infallible and leads to some
false associations, (2) while there is an overwhelming
amount of discriminatory information present in the
fingerprints, the strength of the evidence degrades
drastically with noise in the sensed fingerprint images, (3)
the performance of the state-of-the-art automatic fingerprint
matchers is not even close to the theoretical limit, and (4)
because automatic fingerprint verification systems based on
minutia use only a part of the discriminatory information
present in the fingerprints, it may be desirable to explore
additional complementary representations of fingerprints
for automatic matching.93
Modern science has transformed many disciplines; there is no
reason why the same should not be true for fingerprint
identification.
IX. MAYFIELD REVISITED
The Mayfield case affords important insights into the current
standards of fingerprint identification in the United States. The
misidentification that took place cannot be explained away as the
error of a single incompetent individual, nor can it be rationalized
as the regrettable product of a substandard laboratory. Nor is it
surprising that the safeguards employed by the system failed. The
practice of having additional individuals review a match (the “V”
in ACE-V) has little value if such a review is not blind. Internal
92

See Champod & Evett, supra note 64.
Sharath Pankanti et al., On the Individuality of Fingerprints, 24 IEEE
TRANSACTIONS ON PATTERN ANALYSIS AND MACHINE INTELLIGENCE 1010
(Aug. 2002).
93
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review can be superficial and subject to pressure; the use of
external experts to review a case suffers from the reality that such
individuals, often retired police examiners themselves, may be
overawed by the FBI or state and local agencies, and, human
nature being what it is, in any case predisposed to believe the
original finding.
Mayfield also has things to tell us about the scientific status of
fingerprint examination. The fingerprint profession invariably
attributes errors in identifications to individuals rather than the
underlying methodology itself.94 But, given its unavoidable
subjective component, in latent print examination people are the
process.
This can be seen in Mayfield. In mid-June 2004, the FBI
convened an outside committee of experts to review the FBI’s
handling of the case; the findings of that committee were
summarized in a report written by Robert Stacey of the FBI.95 The
Stacey report states: “The error was a human error and not a
methodological or technology failure.”96 Such a position is hardly
credible. This was not, at a minimum, “a human error” (note the
singular tense), but several errors, on the part of senior FBI
fingerprint examiner Terry Green (who made the initial
identification); supervisory FBI fingerprint specialist Michael
Wieners (the unit chief) and fingerprint examiner John T. Massey
(a retired FBI examiner who had thirty years of experience), both
of whom verified the identification; and Kenneth Moses, director
of Forensic Identification Services of San Francisco, the courtappointed independent expert.97
Initially, the FBI sought to lay the blame on the quality of the
94

See SIMON COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING
(2001).
95
Stacey, supra note 30, at 706-18.
96
Id. at 714.
97
Id. at 710; See also Ben Jacklet & Todd Murphy, Now Free, Mayfield
Turns Furious, PORTLAND TRIB., May 25, 2004, available at
http://www.portlandtribune.com/archview.cgi?id=24535. For the fingerprint
profession’s general proclivity to distinguish between human and
methodological errors and attribute all fingerprint misidentifications to the
former, see generally Cole, Grandfathering Evidence, supra note 70.
AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION
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latent; “Robert Jordan the FBI agent in charge of Oregon . . . said
the FBI’s initial determination about Mayfield’s fingerprint was
‘based on an image of substandard quality.’”98 The June committee
summarily dismissed this: “All of the committee members agree
that the quality of the images that were used to make the erroneous
identification was not a factor.”99
But if it was not the quality of the latent, then what caused the
misidentification? Here the committee pointed to a phenomenon
discussed earlier, “confirmation bias,” or “context effect,” that is,
“the mind-set in which the expectations with which people
approach a task of observation affects their perceptions and
interpretations of what they observe.”100
Unfortunately, it is apparent that the fingerprint community
only partially recognizes the nature of the problem. In discussing
possible remedies, the Stacey report states that:
Procedures that require descriptive documentation . . . and
blind verification (i.e., previous results unknown to the
verifier) should be implemented on designated cases . . . .
The original examiner’s document should be sealed or
withheld from the verifier. The verifier would then conduct
his or her examination independently . . . .101
“Designated cases” are later defined as being “high-profile cases or
cases with latents of poor quality.”102 It is a positive sign that the
report recognizes the importance of blind verification, but puzzling
why it felt this step to be necessary only in “designated cases.” The
reason appears to be that the report believes the problem in
Mayfield arose in part because of the “extremely high-profile”
nature of the case, a circumstance the report alludes to several
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Spain Bomb Case Tossed, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, May 25, 2004, at A7.
Stacey, supra note 30, at 718.
100
Id. at 713. “Context effects” have been discussed in the forensic
literature before. See, e.g., M. J. Saks et al., Context Effects in Forensic Science:
A Review and Application of the Science of Science to Crime Laboratory
Practice in the United States, 43 SCIENCE & JUSTICE 119 (2003), for an excellent
discussion.
101
Stacey, supra note 30, at 715 (emphasis added).
102
Id. at 717.
99
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times.103 In fact, there is no reason why all verifications should not
be blind, and—for the reasons discussed earlier in this paper—
every reason why they should. The potential for bias exists in all
cases, not just “high-profile” ones. (The high-profile cases are, of
course, the ones in which misidentifications are most likely to be
detected.)
The report asserts, perhaps with this issue in mind, that
“[l]atent print examiners routinely conduct verifications in which
they know the previous examiners’ results and yet those results do
not influence the examiner’s conclusions,” but no evidence for this
lapidary statement is furnished, and there is no reason to credit
it.104
The Stacey report also seems naïve in its prescription for
dealing with disagreements. It states:
The verifiers must be willing to oppose any examiner if the
verifiers do not see the details needed to effect the
identification decision. The quality assurance program
should make examiners feel that they can disagree about
any identification. The examiners should be encouraged to
step forward, without fear of reprisal, if they disagree. This
part of the scientific method must be institutionalized.105
The verifiers should not “feel that they can disagree” because there
should be nothing for them to either agree or disagree about.
Blindness is an absolute prerequisite for independent evaluation.
And if disagreement arises after blind verification, then the matter
should be referred to a committee of third parties. Expecting, for
example, a junior verifier to stand up to a senior member of a unit,
especially in an organization like the FBI, is totally unrealistic. It
is, in any case, profoundly disturbing that such issues were only
beginning to be seriously addressed by the FBI in the year 2004.106
103

Id. at 713, 716-17.
Id.
105
Id at 715.
106
It is interesting to speculate on what might have happened in the
Mayfield case if, instead of the Spanish authorities, the FBI had faced a local or
state group. Indeed, in U.S. v. Mitchell, the FBI asked fifty-three law
enforcement agencies whether Mr. Mitchell’s fingerprints matched either of two
latents. U.S. v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 223-25 (3d Cir. 2004). Of the thirty-nine
104
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There are, finally, two aspects of the Mayfield identification
that the Stacey report unfortunately does not address. First, there is
the issue of the discrepancy in the number of matching “points”;
fifteen in the case of the FBI and seven in the case of the Spanish.
If there is a zero methodological error rate for analysis and
comparison, this should not have happened. Second, there is the
issue of the FBI examiners ignoring the dissenting view of the
Spanish. The Stacey report remarks dryly only that “this was
interesting, considering that the identification is filled with
dissimilarities that were easily observed when a detailed analysis
of the latent print was conducted.”107 This is a most unsatisfactory
point at which to leave the matter. No matter how high-profile the
case, how could four experienced examiners overlook such
indicia?
There is at least one plausible explanation. Latent prints can
suffer from both a loss of detail and distortions in the detail
present. The process of identification necessarily involves a
weighing of the amount of agreement in comparing two prints
against the extent of dissimilarities that may just reflect distortions
arising from the way in which the latent was deposited. There was
a considerable amount of agreement between Mr. Mayfield’s print
and the latent; the Stacey report refers twice to the “power of the
IAFIS [Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System]
correlation.”108 The “power of the IAFIS correlation” simply
means that, among the candidate matching prints generated by
IAFIS, one of them was so similar to (that is, highly “correlated
with”) Mayfield’s that the three senior FBI examiners involved in
the examination concluded that Mayfield had to be the source of
the latent. This example demonstrates that, when searching tens of
millions of inked prints, the fingerprint community has no real idea
of just how close a near miss can be.
The persistence of both the FBI examiners and the independent
court-appointed expert in their assessments can be viewed not as
agencies that responded, nine believed that Mr. Mitchell’s prints did not match
either latent, but most of these agencies retreated from this position when the
FBI continued to press the matter. Id.
107
Stacey, supra note 30, at 714.
108
Id. at 713.
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the result of an error, in the sense of a departure from some
unspecified protocol, but as merely reflecting their subjective
judgment that the strength of the correlation and their ability to
rationalize the apparent differences present indicated that the two
prints had a common source. The Spanish obviously had different
standards. The ability of the review committee to rationalize away
the differences in findings as due to the high-profile nature of the
case, rather than being the result of a methodological error, may
itself reflect a form of “confirmation bias” (recall this is “the mindset in which the expectations with which people approach a task of
observation affects their perceptions and interpretations of what
they observe”).
X. DISCUSSION
“We just did our job and made a mistake . . . . That’s how I
like to think of it—an honest mistake . . . . I’ll preach
fingerprints till I die. They’re infallible. I still consider
myself one of the best in the world.”109
The forensic use of fingerprints is now more than a century
old.110 Introduced when forensic science was in its infancy,
fingerprints were subject to only limited scrutiny before being
generally accepted by the courts.111
Central to this acceptance appears to be what Simon Cole has
termed “the fingerprint examiner’s fallacy”—the argument that
fingerprint identification is valid because “fingerprints are
unique.”112 This is akin, as Cole notes, to arguing that eyewitness
identification is dependable on the grounds that the human face is
unique.113 Identification of any kind involves the extraction and
109

John Massey, referring to the Mayfield misidentification. McRoberts et
al., supra note 5. The quotation is remarkable: an error was made, the examiner
considers himself one of the best in the world, but fingerprints are infallible.
110
COLE, supra note 94.
111
Id.
112
Cole, Grandfather Evidence, supra note 97, at 1197–1203.
113
Id. at 1202.
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analysis of features; the fundamental issue is not the “uniqueness”
of the object under scrutiny (be it the human face, the friction ridge
patterns of the human finger, or the sequence of bases in human
DNA), but the accuracy of the process used to extract features and
analyze them.
One reason for the widespread acceptance of this logical
fallacy may be the failure to recognize the crucial difference
between an inked and a latent print. If we think of Figure 1(a), an
inked print, then the dependability of the process may seem selfevident; however, the true issue is our ability to extract information
from the all-too frequent reality of Figure 1(b), the latent print.
From the start, the fingerprint community has claimed the
ability, given sufficient detail, to identify the source of a latent to
the exclusion of all others. For example, examiners have made
assertions that fingerprints are “infallible,” that an identification is
“100 percent positive,” and that the “methodological error rate” for
parts of the process is zero.114 Such claims have no scientific basis,
a fact now recognized by some members of the profession itself.115
When fingerprint identification errors have been discovered in the
past, the fingerprint community has almost invariably attributed
them to incompetent individuals rather problems or limitations in
the methodology itself. But there is no “methodology,” apart from
the individual, in the sense of a universally accepted and objective
set of protocols that can be applied to a set of prints to establish
identity of source. Fingerprint proponents, however, often ascribe
fingerprint identification the status of a science, referring to the
ACE-V “methodology” as being part of the scientific method.
114

Id. at 1231–32.
Grieve, supra note 80, at 528. Grieve writes:
[T]his categorical requirement of absolute certainty has no particular
scientific principle but has evolved from a practice shaped more from
allegiance to dogma than a foundation in science. Once begun, the
assumption of absolute certainty as the only possible conclusion has
been maintained by a system of societal indoctrination, not reason, and
has achieved such a ritualistic sanctity that even mild suggestions that
its premise should be re-examined are instantly regarded as acts of
blasphemy. Whatever this may be, it is not science.

115

Id.
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ACE-V is an acronym, not a methodology. It is merely the common
sense description of what anyone would do if they were examining
a latent and a candidate source print. All of this is not to say that
fingerprint examination may not usually get things right. The
problem is that we have no true idea of the underlying error rate.
Society and the courts accord science great deference and
respect. When a scientist testifies in court, he is often viewed as an
impartial and objective expert reporting the indisputable facts of
science to us. If a forensic scientist tells us that it is 100% certain
that an individual was present at a crime scene and has the blood of
the victim on his clothes, this may be decisive in an otherwise
tenuous case. This places great responsibility, but also great power,
in the hands of a witness.
Today we accord forensic DNA evidence such a role, but it
was hard earned and is well deserved. If a forensic scientist claims
that a person is, to a high degree of likelihood, the source of the
evidentiary DNA found at the crime scene, there is usually a solid
scientific foundation for such an assertion, ordinarily documented
in great detail in a case file that can be reviewed by outside
experts, including individuals other than crime laboratory
technicians. Each new major advance in the forensic use of DNA is
accompanied by validation studies and tested in the fire of
admissibility hearings. “Trust but verify” is the watchword.
The same cannot be said for fingerprint evidence. Latent print
examination necessarily contains a large subjective component,
something that automatically rules out certainty. The ability of the
human mind to see what it hopes or expects is truly remarkable,
and this ability flourishes in the absence of stringent safeguards.116
In the past, the fingerprint community has defended its lack of
scientific grounding, in part, by appealing to its track record in the
courts. The importance of Cowans and Mayfield, among other
things, is that they underscore the shakiness of such an argument.
116

See Michel D. Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of
Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and
Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002) (providing an excellent review of the
ability of the human mind to see what it hopes or expects to see). See also EVON
Z. VOGT & RAY HYMAN, WATER WITCHING, U.S.A. (2d ed. 1979) (offering a
classic discussion of this phenomenon).
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Obtaining a conviction does not validate the identification.
Despite the present unsatisfactory state of affairs, there are
some obvious remedies. A rigorous system of mandatory, frequent,
external blind proficiency testing needs to be implemented.
Second, a mechanism for routine, random, blind audits of latent
identifications should be established. Third, the government needs
to fund research into the validity and reliability of fingerprint
identification, the development of pattern recognition software,
and the quantification of the uncertainty inherent in latent print
identifications.
Finally, the courts have a role to play as well. Limits should be
placed on the testimony of fingerprint examiners (“100 percent
positive identification”), so that their testimony reflects the true
limits of their expertise. “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one
must remain silent.”117

117

“Wovon Mann nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss Mann schweigen.”
(The concluding sentence of LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICOPHILOSOPHICUS (1921)).

